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The University System of Georgia’s Well-Being
Policy Regarding Tobacco Product Use: A Proposal for Changing from Opt-Out to Opt-In
Donald L. Ariail (Kennesaw State University)
Benedikt M. Quosigk (Kennesaw State University)

The University System of Georgia (USG) has a state-wide initiative aimed at increasing the wellbeing of faculty and staff by incentivizing a decrease in tobacco product usage by employees
covered by a USG healthcare plan. This incentive is positive in that aid in stopping tobacco
product usage is offered to each member; and negative in that each member who is a tobacco
product user is penalized. A healthcare surcharge is added to the monthly health insurance
premium paid by each faculty/staff member for themselves and covered dependents over 18
years of age who are tobacco product users. The current policy considers covered employees
and their applicable dependents to be users of tobacco products unless they annually opt-out.
This paper includes summaries of the incidence of cigarette and tobacco product usage in the
U.S., a summary of USG’s policies related to the current tobacco initiative, a brief literature review
regarding opt-in and opt-out programs, and a discussion of the possible negative impact of the
current USG tobacco use policy. Support is provided for the present tobacco surcharge penalty
being either eliminated or its implementation changed, and for the current opt-out default being
changed to an opt-in program.

Key Words: Health Insurance, opt-in vs. 0pt-out programs, tobacco product usage, tobacco use
penalty, sin tax, regressive tax
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Despite cigarette usage in the United States

member who is a tobacco product user or

(U.S.) having decreased since 1965 by 67%

has covered dependents over 18 years of

(ALA, n.d.), the use of tobacco products re-

age who are tobacco product users, would

mains a leading cause of preventable dis-

be required to opt into the program—annu-

eases (CDC, n.d.). The University System of

ally declaring by opting-in that they are a to-

Georgia (USG) has a state-wide initiative

bacco product user. Therefore, our research

(Well-Being Initiative, 2020) aimed at in-

question (RQ) is as follows:

creasing the well-being of faculty and staff by

RQ: Is there support for the USG

incentivizing a decrease in tobacco product

Well-Being Initiative changing its tobacco

usage by those members covered by a USG

use policy from an opt-out to an opt-in pro-

healthcare plan. The incentive is both posi-

gram?

tive and negative: Positive in that aid in re-

In attempting to answer this question,

ducing tobacco product usage is offered to

this paper proceeds with summaries of the

each member; and negative in that each

rate of occurrence (incidence) of both histor-

member who is a tobacco product user is pe-

ical and current cigarette and tobacco prod-

nalized. A healthcare surcharge is added to

uct usage in the U.S., a summary of USG’s

the monthly health insurance premium paid

policies related to the current tobacco Well-

by each member for themselves and covered

Being Initiative, a summary of USG employ-

dependents over 18 years of age who are to-

ment, a literature review regarding opt-in and

bacco product users. The current Board of

opt-out programs, a discussion of possible

Regents (BOR) policy is to consider the

negative impacts resulting from the current

member and applicable dependents as users

USG tobacco use policy, and a conclusion

of tobacco products unless the member opts

which includes a proposal for either eliminat-

out on an annual basis. That is, the default

ing the surcharge or restructuring how it is

position is that the member is a user of to-

determined, and for changing the USG to-

bacco products.

bacco use policy from an opt-out to an opt-in

The authors propose that the default

default.

option be changed from assuming that mem-

Tobacco Use in the U.S.

bers are tobacco product users (the opt-out

As indicated in the selected data included in

option) to assuming that members are not

Table 1, the CDC (2018) reported the 2017

users of tobacco products (the opt-in option).

incidence of cigarette smoking in the U.S. at

That is, changing from an opt-out to an opt-

15.8% for men and 12.3% for women. For

in default. With an opt-in program each

age ranges between 35-65, which may
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roughly approximate the ages of the majority

33.7% for women, there has been a notable

of USG faculty and staff, the incidence of

decrease in cigarette smoking. A year-by-

smoking is 9.0%-18.7% for men and 7.5%-

year analysis performed by the American

16.0% for women. In other words, a high ma-

Lung Association (ALA, n.d.) of CDC data in-

jority of both men and women in the U.S. do

dicated an overall decrease of 67% in ciga-

not smoke cigarettes. Compared to cigarette

rette smoking.

smoking rates in 1965 of 51.9% for men and

Table 1
Incidence of Cigarette Smoking (%) in the United States: 1965-2017. Selected demographics
adapted from CDC (2018) Table 17 Trends Tables.
1965

1979

1985

1990

2000

2005

2010

2014

2015

2016

2017

Male

51.9

37.5

32.6

28.4

25.6

23.9

21.5

18.8

16.7

17.5

15.8

Female

33.7

30.1

27.9

22.9

21.1

18.3

17.5

15.1

13.8

13.7

12.3

18-24

54.1

35.0

28.0

26.6

28.1

28.0

22.8

18.5

15.0

14.7

12.0

25-34

60.7

43.9

38.2

31.6

28.9

27.7

26.1

23.7

21.3

20.7

19.9

35-44

58.2

41.8

37.6

34.5

30.2

26.0

22.5

22.0

18.3

20.6

18.7

45-54

55.9

42.0

34.9

32.1

28.8

28.1

25.2

19.9

18.3

19.1

17.5

55-64

49.6

36.4

31.9

25.9

22.6

21.1

20.7

18.8

17.5

19.7

17.3

>65

28.5

20.9

19.6

14.6

10.2

8.9

9.7

9.8

9.7

10.1

9.0

18-24

38.1

33.8

30.4

22.5

24.9

20.7

17.4

14.8

11.0

11.5

8.8

25-34

43.7

33.7

32.0

28.2

22.3

21.5

20.6

17.5

15.0

13.9

13.0

35-44

43.7

37.0

31.5

24.8

26.2

21.3

19.0

17.0

16.5

15.4

12.9

45-54

37.5

32.6

32.4

28.5

22.2

20.9

21.3

18.7

18.4

18.5

15.2

55-64

25.0

28.6

27.4

20.5

20.9

16.1

16.5

14.8

13.7

15.0

16.0

9.6

13.2

13.5

11.5

9.3

8.3

9.3

7.5

7.3

7.7

7.5

Gender

Age (All Males)

Age (All Females)

>65

As of November 15, 2019, the latest data

(Table 2) a further decrease in the incidence

available, the CDC’s Morbidity and Mortality

of cigarette smoking to an overall rate of

Weekly Report (MMWR, 2019) indicated

13.7%: 15.6% for men and 12.0% for
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women. However, taking into account all

West regions but lower than the rates in the

forms of tobacco usage, which includes E-

Midwest region. Of interest to the present

cigarettes, the rates were 25.8% for men and

study, adults with graduate degrees, which

14.1% for women. The overall tobacco us-

would include almost all instructional faculty,

age was 23.8% for ages 25-44, and 21.3%

had the lowest incidence of the usage of cig-

for ages 45-64. On a regional basis, the

arettes and all tobacco products: 3.7% for

Southern region had an overall rate of to-

cigarette use and 8.2% for the use of any to-

bacco product usage of 21.4% which was

bacco product (MMWR, 2019).

higher than the rates in the Northeast and

Table 2
2018 Incidence of Tobacco Product Usage in the United States
Any Tobacco Product (%) E-Cigarettes (%) Cigarettes (%)
Overall

19.7

Gender:
Male
25.8
Female
14.1
Age:
18-24
17.1
25-44
23.8
45-64
21.3
>65
11.9
Census Region:
Northeast
17.5
Midwest
23.6
South
21.4
West
15.3
Education (adults > 25 yrs.):
0-12 (no diploma)
25.9
GED
41.4
High school diploma
25.2
Some college, no degree
24.7
Associate degree
21.3
Undergraduate degree
13.0
Graduate degree
8.2
Source:
Selected
data
adapted
from
Weekly Report (MMWR), November 15, 2019

CDC

3.2

13.7

4.3
2.3

15.6
12.0

7.6
4.3
2.1
0.8

7.8
16.5
16.3
8.4

2.2
4.0
3.5
2.9

12.5
16.2
14.8
10.7

2.5
2.7
4.1
3.0
2.2
Morbidity

and

21.8
36.0
19.7
18.3
14.8
10.6
3.7
Mortality

Georgia Journal of College Student Affairs

84

USG Well-Being Tobacco Use Policy

age who are all tobacco users would pay

While the incidence of tobacco product us-

$500 per month in surcharges or $6,000 per

age in the U.S. continues to decline, the

year. Thus, a faculty or staff member who

USG’s 2020 Wellness Initiative includes a

makes an inadvertent error in not opting out

punitive policy regarding the use of tobacco

could pay dearly, and this error cannot be ret-

products by faculty and staff. According to

roactively reversed. New hires and covered

Chancellor Wrigley, “the goal of the USG

family members who are not tobacco users

Wellness Initiative is to increase opportuni-

must opt-out within 30 days of being em-

ties for our employees to participate in a pro-

ployed. All other faculty must complete to-

gram that will assist them to lead happier and

bacco use certification information (opt-out

healthier lives as well as aid in reducing per-

or be defaulted in) each year during the

sonal and healthcare costs” (Chancellor’s

health care enrollment period (USG Well-Be-

Letter, n.d., para. 3). Currently, the tobacco

ing, 2020).

product usage policy is an opt-out program.

A USG employee who fraudulently

Employees and staff who are covered by a

opts out of being a tobacco product user can

USG healthcare plan and who do not use any

be subject to criminal prosecution. That is, an

form of tobacco products must certify that

employee who falsely certifies that they (in-

they and their covered family members,

cluding covered dependents who are 18+

which includes dependents who are over 18

years of age) are not tobacco users are sub-

years of age, are not tobacco users. The de-

ject to criminal prosecution. The Tobacco

fault position is that the faculty/staff and their

Use Certification Information specifies the

applicable dependents are tobacco users.

false opt-out penalty as follows:

The surcharge for family tobacco users is

If you knowingly and willfully make a

$100 per month per person. According to the

fraudulent statement to the University

USG’s Tobacco Use Certification Information

System of Georgia regarding your

(USG Well-Being, 2020), faculty/staff who

insurance coverage, including your

are deemed (including errors in not opting

status as a tobacco user, you may be

out) tobacco users will “each month . . . pay

subject to criminal prosecution.

between $100-$300 (or more in some cases)

Under state law (at O.C.G.A. Section

in additional surcharges, depending on how

16-10-20), if convicted, you shall be

many people are covered by . . . [the] USG

punished by a fine of no more than

healthcare plan. No refunds will be given”

$1,000.00 or by imprisonment for no

(pp. 2-3). Consequently, a member with a

less than one nor more than five

spouse and three dependents over 18 years
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years, or both. (USG Well-Being,

defined as “. . . any offense punishable by

2020, para. 11)

imprisonment for a term of one year or more

In addition, having been found guilty

and includes conviction by a court-martial

of an ethics violation or a criminal offense the

under the Uniform Code of Military Justice for

policy may subject faculty and staff to disci-

an offense which would constitute a felony

plinary actions including termination of em-

under the laws of the United States”

ployment. The ethics policy contained in

(FindLaw, n.d.). Thus, faculty and staff found

Section 8.2.18.1 of the Code of Conduct of

guilty of lying about their use of a tobacco

the BOR’s Policy Manual requires, in part,

product could potentially be terminated.

that “member[s] of the USG community . . .
comply with all applicable laws, rules, regu-

USG Employment

lations, and professional standards” [empha-

As of fall semester 2019 the USG had a total

sis added]. In addition, the BOR’s Policy

of 49,541 employees. Of this number, 11,851

Manual (BORPM: 8.3.9.1) in part indicates

were full-time instructional faculty with the re-

that grounds for the removal of faculty in-

mainder composed of 1,550 other instruc-

clude “conviction or admission of guilt of a

tional faculty and 36,140 non-instructional

felony . . . during the period of employment .

employees. Faculty members were predom-

. . [and] violation of Board of Regents’ poli-

inately male (53.8%) and had graduate de-

cies . . ..” Under Georgia Code Title 16,

grees (97.9%). A summary of USG employ-

Crimes and Offenses § 16-11-131 a felony is

ment data is presented in Table 3

Table 3.
USG Employees Fall 2019
Full-Time Faculty
Gender
Male
Female
Other
Education
Graduate Degree
Undergraduate Degree
Other Instructional Faculty
Temporary
Other
Non-Instructional employees
Total Employees
Source: USG Faculty Data (n.d.)

11,851
6,372
5,469
10
11,599
252
1,550
479
1,071
36,140
49,541
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Opt-In Opt-Out Literature Review

al., 2018). On the other hand, Rutecka-Gora

As previously indicated, the authors suggest

et al. (2018) suggested that an opt-in default

that the USG change their tobacco product

comes with implicit fixed or barrier costs that

usage policy from an opt-out to an opt-in pro-

can prevent an individual from making the

gram. Accordingly, a review of the literature

most beneficial choice. These barriers in-

was undertaken. This review indicated that

clude costs of obtaining information relevant

the published research on opt-in and opt-out

to participation and investment choices and

choices is scant. When presented with a de-

of becoming knowledgeable about investing.

cision, either of the two choices can be used

McMichael (2008) provided another

as a default option. In theory these choices

example of an opt-out program being used to

neither affect relative prices nor supply and

overcome inertia. The U.S. Department of

demand. However, outcomes can be greatly

Defense supported an opt-out default for

affected by an opt-out default option as iner-

their Thrift Savings Plan (TSP)—a plan that

tia can result in greater participation (e.g.,

provided troops with tax-free earnings at re-

McMichael, 2008; Rutecka-Gora et al.,

tirement. McMichael suggested that through

2018).

As indicated below, many opt-out

an opt-out default sign up process troop iner-

policies are instituted to produce a perceived

tia worked to their benefit by providing retire-

“good” for the individual (e.g., pension or sav-

ment earnings that could have inadvertently

ings plan participation) or for society (e.g.,

been lost. That is, members of the military

the availability of organs for transplant).

were deemed by default to agreeing to par-

Inertia, which is defined by Merriam-

ticipate in the TSP. To change their partici-

Webster dictionary as including an “indispo-

pation status, they had to opt-out of the plan.

sition to motion, exertion, or change,” is a

Much of the literature regarding de-

widely accepted phenomenon that affects

fault options relate to organ donations. Fer-

many consumers (Johnen, 2019). The opt-

guson et al. (2020) argued that in this regard

out system is being used in many areas

an opt-in system presents a free-rider prob-

whereby overcoming inertia it directly bene-

lem where individuals that have not opted-in

fits the consumer. In the case of pension cov-

still benefit from the system. That is, at no

erage an opt-out option can improve the out-

cost to themselves free riders receive a po-

come for individual employees since an opt-

tential benefit. The larger the donor base, the

in system can result in some employees,

greater the availability of organs. In addition,

those who fail to sign up because of inertia,

by the free rider not opting into organ dona-

being left without coverage (Rutecka-Gora et

tion, others may be discouraged from
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registering or may decide to deregister. An

to organ donation based on their personal re-

opt-out system generally has significantly

ligious beliefs. For example, Wen (2014)

more individuals signed up for organ dona-

noted that “. . . Catholics are less likely to do-

tions than does an opt-in default (Davidai et

nate than other religious groups. . .” (para.

al., 2012). Stanford|SPARQ (n.d.), a self-

11). Thus, an opt-out policy could indivertibly

styled “do tank,” suggested that the U.S.

result in organ donations by people who ob-

should change from an opt-in to an opt-out

ject to having their organs taken—a potential

organ donation policy. They indicated that

public injustice that must be weighed against

such a change would increase the U.S. or-

the potential for public good.

gan donation rate from around 15% to about

In regard to organ donations, a de-

the 90% donation rate found in opt-out coun-

fault also virtue signals or recommends a

tries. In addition, Shepherd et al. (2014)

certain action (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003).

found that “opt-out consent is . . . associated

If the default is to opt-out then the govern-

with an increase in the total number of livers

ment has made a conscious choice for its cit-

and kidneys transplanted” (p. 10).

izens that suggests a best practice, namely

By providing more in short supply or-

the donation of organs. This accepted and

gans for transplant, it can be argued that an

virtuous choice needs no additional input

opt-out policy provides a public good. Never-

from the citizen rather an individual who

theless, organ donation is an intimate per-

wishes not to donate organs would have to

sonal decision. Due to reasons such as dis-

make a conscious decision and take action

trust of the medical profession and religious

in order to opt-out. In the case of making this

objections, many people do not want to do-

selection when applying for a driver’s license

nate their organs. Distrust of the medical pro-

several barriers may exist. The selection

fession includes donor questions about brain

may not be entirely anonymous if the individ-

death versus death from one’s heart stop-

ual has to communicate the choice to a clerk

ping, and whether non-organ donors might

or complete the form in public and pass it to

be kept alive longer (Wen, 2014). According

the clerk for data entry. Further, the license

to Bruzzone (2008), “no religion forbids do-

may state the selection publicly, which cre-

nation or receipt of organs or is against trans-

ates an additional hurdle to choosing con-

plantation” (p. 1064). However, some sects

trary to the accepted default. Under an opt-

of Judaism and Islam proscribe directed or-

out system for organ donations, each citizen

gan donation and transplantation (Bruzzone,

potentially benefits from the organ donations

2008). Nevertheless, people may still object

of others directly or indirectly. When opting
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out of the organ donation program one might

practice was determined inappropriate by the

be seen as a “free rider” who may consume

Office of Fair Trade in the U.K. and lenders

benefits without incurring any cost.

were told to switch to an opt-in arrangement

Opt-out defaults can also have real

(Bibby, 1994).

costs for consumers. In the example of Med-

In another example from Canberra,

icaid managed care, Marton et al. (2017) de-

Canada, the practice of mandatory student

scribed how the auto sign up for Medicaid

unionism was abolished for an opt-out union

plans benefited neither the system by keep-

fee system. The opt-out system was selected

ing costs low nor the average consumer by

over an opt-in system expressly for the pur-

covering their needs. Inertia caused most in-

pose of keeping memberships and fee reve-

dividuals to remain in their auto assigned

nues at ‘useful’ levels. This change suggests

plans. Only the highest cost individuals

that decision makers believed that an opt-in

changed their plans which resulted in ad-

default would not collect sufficient revenues,

verse selection and individual plan margin

and that inertia was counted on to subsidize

declines.

otherwise

In some instances, however, opt-out

unsustainable

fee

revenues

(“Power play a test for O’Farrell,” 2008).

defaults along with inertia are used specifically to achieve higher payments while

Estimated Impacts of the Tobacco Sur-

providing fewer average benefits, seemingly

charge Incidence of Tobacco Product Us-

under a profit motive. For example, Bibby

age

(1994) described the credit industry practice

The incidence of cigarette smoking has tre-

in the United Kingdom (U.K.) of automatically

mendously decreased over the past 50 years

selling payment protection insurance policies

(Table 1). In 1965, 51% of males and 33.7%

to customers who bought on credit. Credit

of females smoked, while in 2017 only 15.8%

plan protection insurance was sold under an

of males and 12.3% of females smoked. In

opt-out system were the consumer had to act

other words, 84.2% of men and 87.7% of fe-

(actively indicate no) in order to not be

males do not smoke cigarettes. However, in

charged the extra insurance fee. Consumers

recent years other tobacco products, such as

usually had to tick a small box on their credit

E-cigarettes, have become popular as ciga-

application in order to opt-out of the payment

rette substitutes. The 2018 incidence of to-

protection insurance. However, most con-

bacco product usage was 25.8% for males

sumers were not aware of this option and so

and 14.1% for females. Tobacco product us-

unknowingly purchased the insurance. This

age in the southern region of the U.S.
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averaged 21.4% (Table 2). Therefore, the

1. Total number of full time USG em-

vast majority (78.6%) of adults in the South-

ployees at 47,991, which is, per Table 3,

ern region do not use tobacco products.

composed of 11,851 full time faculty and

The level of one’s education influ-

36,140 non-instructional employees. “Other

ences the incidence of tobacco product use.

instructional faculty” of 1,055 were not in-

As indicated in Table 2, adults with a GED

cluded. According to the USG Faculty Data

have the highest rate (41.4%), adults with an

(n.d.) “other instructional faculty” are not full-

undergraduate degree have a lower rate

time faculty and thus are probably not eligible

(13.0%), and adults with a graduate degree

to participate in a USG health plan.

have the lowest rate (8.2%). As presented in

2. Eighty percent of faculty are cov-

Table 3, 11,599 of 11,851 (97.9%) of the fac-

ered by a USG health insurance plan. This is

ulty in the USG have graduate degrees and

a very conservative estimate. Perhaps well

252 (2.1%) have undergraduate degrees.

over 90% of USG full time employees take

This data suggests that about 91.7% of full-

advantage of the health insurance benefit.

time USG instructional faculty probably do

3. Estimated tobacco usage rates of

not use tobacco products: 11,851 total full-

20%, 15%, and 10%. The top rate of 20% is

time faculty, less 13% of faculty with under-

a rounded estimate based on a weighted av-

graduate degrees, less 8.2% of faculty with

erage of 20.4% computed using national sta-

graduate degrees equals 10,867, divided by

tistics (Table 2) and the gender of fulltime

11,851 equals 91.7%.

faculty (Table 3), which was the only gender
information available. A rounded upper esti-

Estimated Tobacco Use Surcharges

mate of 20% seems to be further supported

The present authors have requested that the

by the CDC MMWR (2019) data that indi-

BOR provide the total amounts of surcharges

cates 21.4% of adults in the Southern Region

paid by USG members since the Well-Being

of the U.S. use a tobacco product (Table 2).

Initiative (2020) was implemented and to pro-

The low percentage of 10% is a rounded es-

vide information regarding the number of

timate of tobacco product usage based on

USG employees covered by a USG health

the weighted average of 8.3% estimated for

insurance plan. This data has not been forth-

full time faculty who have undergraduate or

coming. Therefore, in Table 4, estimates are

graduate degrees plus an arbitrary addition

provided. These calculations were made us-

of 1.7% for staff. The 15% percentage is the

ing the following assumptions:

midpoint percentage. Again, the actual
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percentage of faculty and staff who use to-

member covered to $46,074,000 for five

bacco products was not provided by the

members. At an estimated 15% rate, the

BOR.

range is $6,909,600 to $34,548,000; and at
4. Tobacco surcharge amounts are

an estimated 10% rate, the range is

based on one to five covered employees and

$4,606,800 to $23,034,000. Conservatively

their dependents.

estimating that only one to two covered

As shown in Table 4, at a 20% esti-

members pay the surcharge and using the

mated tobacco product usage rate, and de-

three estimated rates provides the following

pending on the total number of members

ranges: $4,606,800-$9,213,600 at 10%,

covered, the total annual tobacco use sur-

$6,909,600-13,819,200

charges range from $9,214,800 for one

$9,214,800-$18,429,600 at 20%.

at

15%,

and

Table 4
Estimated Tobacco Surcharges Paid Under Various Assumptions
Estimated

*Estimated No.

Total

Amount per

Annual

Potential

Tobacco

of Covered

Members

Month

Amount

Totals

Usage

Employees

Covered

(C = B x $100)

(D = C x 12)

(A x D)

Rates

Impacted (A)

(B)

20%

7,679
1
100
$1,200
$ 9,214,800
7,679
2
200
$2,400
$18,429,600
7,679
3
300
$3,600
$27,644,400
7,679
4
400
$4,800
$36,859,200
7,679
5
500
$6,000
$46,074,000
15%
5,758
1
100
$1,200
$ 6,909,600
5,758
2
200
$2,400
$13,819,200
5,758
3
300
$3,600
$20,728,800
5,758
4
400
$4,800
$27,638,400
5,758
5
500
$6,000
$34,548,000
10%
3,839
1
100
$1,200
$ 4,606,800
3,839
2
200
$2,400
$ 9,213,600
3,839
3
300
$3,600
$13,820,400
3,839
4
400
$4,800
$18,427,200
3,839
5
500
$6,000
$23,034,000
*Assumptions: Approximately 80% of 47,991 USG employees (Table 3) are covered by a USG
sponsored health insurance program: full time faculty (11,851) + non-instructional employees
(36,140) x .80 = 38,393; .20 x 38,393 = 7,679; .15 x 38,393 = 5,758; .10 x 38,393 = 3,839.
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Potential Windfall to Insurance

have estimated failure to opt-out rates (fail-

Companies

ure rates) of 1%, 0.5%, and 0.25%. The ac-

The present authors have been unable to ob-

tual rate of USG employees indivertibly fail-

tain data from the BOR regarding the amount

ing to opt-out of being tobacco product users

of tobacco surcharges paid by USG employ-

has not been provided by the BOR.

ees. While we believe that the failure rate

The results, as presented in Table 5,

(percentage of eligible employees who inad-

indicate that at an estimated failure rate of

vertently fail to opt-out) is probably small, the

1%, the total dollar amounts range from

total dollar amounts of tobacco surcharges

$460,000 to $2,304,000. At a .05% failure

paid by non-tobacco users can still be signif-

rate, the total amounts range from $230,000

icant. We have estimated the total dollar

to $1,152,000; and at a .25% failure rate the

amounts using the same assumptions as in

amounts range from $115,200 to $576,000.

Table 4 of 47,991 full-time employees with

Of course, the actual failure rate could be

one to five covered members. In addition, we

higher than 1% or lower than .25%.

Table 5
Estimated Windfall to Insurance Companies of Employee Inadvertent Failure to Opt-Out as a
Tobacco User: Estimates Using Various Assumptions
Estimated
*Estimated No.
Total
Amount per
Annual
Potential
Opt-Out
of Covered
Members
Month
Amount
Totals
Failure Rate
Employees
Covered
(C = Bx$100)
(D = C x 12)
(A x D)
Impacted (A)
(B)
1%
384
1
$100
$1,200
$ 460,800
384
2
$200
$2,400
$ 921,600
384
3
$300
$3,600
$1,382,400
384
4
$400
$4,800
$1,843,200
384
5
$500
$6,000
$2,304,000
.5%
192
1
$100
$1,200
$ 230,400
192
2
$200
$2,400
$ 460,800
192
3
$300
$3,600
$ 691,200
192
4
$400
$4,800
$ 921,600
192
5
$500
$6,000
$1,152,000
.25%
96
1
$100
$1,200
$ 115,200
96
2
$200
$2,400
$ 230,400
96
3
$200
$3,600
$ 345,600
96
4
$200
$4,800
$ 460,800
96
5
$200
$6,000
$ 576,000
*Assumptions: Approximately 80% of 47,991 USG employees (Table 3) are covered by a USG
sponsored health insurance plan: full time faculty (11,851) + non-instructional employees
(36,140) x .80 = 38,393; .01 x 38,393 = 384; .005 x 38,393 = 192; .0025 x 38,393 = 96
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USG employees is perhaps better illustrated

Failure to opt-out of being a tobacco user can

as a percentage of average salaries.

result in egregious penalties. Depending on

The percentages of average instruc-

the number of family members covered by a

tional faculty salaries represented by annual

USG insurance sponsored plan, the monthly

tobacco surcharges of $1,200 to $6,000 are

surcharge is $100-$500, assuming a maxi-

presented in Table 6. The higher the faculty’s

mum number of covered members at five

salary the lower the percentage impact of the

(this number could actually be higher). The

surcharge. The lowest is 0.76% for profes-

annual amounts range from $1,200 to

sors at research institutions, while the high-

$6,000. While these raw amounts appear im-

est is 12.82% for instructors/lecturers at state

pactful, the potential negative impact on

colleges.

Table 6
Estimated Tobacco Surcharge Impact on Faculty of as a Percentage of Average Salaries

Type of Institution and Surcharge
for 1-5 People Covered
Research Universities
$1,200 (x1)
$2,400 (x2)
$3,600 (x3)
$4,800 (x4)
$6,000 (x5)
Comprehensive Universities
$1,200 (x1)
$2,400 (x2)
$3,600 (x3)
$4,800 (x4)
$6,000 (x5)
State Universities
$1,200 (x1)
$2,400 (x2)
$3,600 (x3)
$4,800 (x4)
$6,000 (x5)

Average Salaries*/% of Salary
Professor Associate
Assistant
Instructor/
Professor
Professor
Lecturer
$158,190 $116,700
$110,377
$67,199
.76%
1.03%
1.09%
1.79%
1.52%
2.06%
2.17%
3.57%
2.28%
3.08%
3.26%
5.36%
3.03%
4.11%
4.35%
7.14%
3.79%
5.14%
5.44%
8.93%
$89,077
$73,262
$67,473
$51,401
1.35%
1.64%
1.78%
2.33%
2.69%
3.28%
3.56%
4.67%
4.04%
4.91%
5.34%
7.00%
5.39%
6.55%
7.11%
9.34%
6.74%
8.19%
8.89%
11.67%
$79,213
$65,382
$60,224
$48,723
1.51%
1.84%
1.99%
2.46%
3.03%
3.67%
3.99%
4.93%
4.54%
5.51%
5.98%
7.39%
6.06%
7.34%
7.97%
9.85%
7.57%
9.18%
9.96%
12.31%
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State Colleges

$72,181
$63,730
$1,200 (x1)
1.66%
1.88%
$2,400 (x2)
3.32%
3.77%
$3,600 (x3)
4.99%
5.65%
$4,800 (x4)
6.65%
7.53%
$6,000 (x5)
8.31%
9.41%
* Source: USG Average Instructional Faculty Salaries 2019.

$60,211
1.99%
3.99%
5.98%
7.97%
9.96%

$46,801
2.56%
5.13%
7.69%
10.26%
12.82%

The present authors have not been

usage is at 91.7%. Therefore, based on na-

able to obtain average salaries for non-in-

tional rates of tobacco product usage, the de-

structional employees. Nevertheless, non-in-

fault position of opt-out (which assumes that

structional members who earn similar sala-

all faculty members are tobacco users) is not

ries would pay the same rates. For example,

warranted. Tobacco product usage data thus

if an instructional or a non-instructional mem-

supports an opt-in rather than an opt-out pro-

ber earns $50,000, the range of surcharges

gram.

produce rates of 2.4%, 4.8%, 7.2%, and
12%.

With group plans, insurance companies use group averages to calculate riskbased premiums (Cogan, 2018). In a given

Discussion

year individuals that do not have claims sub-

No matter how one looks at the national data

sidize the costs of those that do. On average,

presented in Table 2, and assuming that

younger group members subsidize older

USG member tobacco usage is in accord

group members. The tobacco surcharge can

with national data, the great majority of USG

be likened to the risk adjustment made by au-

plan members are probably not users of to-

tomobile insurance companies based on the

bacco products. Overall, 80.3%, and by

individual’s driving record. With the tobacco

Southern region 78.6%, of adults do not use

use surcharge insurance companies have

tobacco products. Breaking the data into the

added an individual risk into the member’s in-

demographic areas of gender and education

surance premium, which essentially de-

provides even larger percentages of non-to-

creases the beneficial effects of group sub-

bacco product usage. By gender, male non-

sidy.

usage is at 74.2% and female non-usage is

The tobacco surcharge can also be

at 85.9%. By education, for faculty members,

viewed as a punishment for a certain behav-

of whom 97.9% hold a graduate degree

ior. Tobacco usage is already curtailed by

(USG Faculty Data, n.d.; cf. Table 3), non-

various laws. For example, laws commonly
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restrict tobacco usage to certain areas.

The tobacco use surcharge provides

Moreover, “sin” taxes have long been im-

a substantial benefit to insurance providers.

posed on the purchase of cigarettes. Federal

As indicated in Table 4, it is estimated that

and state excise taxes currently account for

USG members annually pay millions of dol-

about half of the cost of a pack of 20 ciga-

lars in tobacco surcharges. How do these

rettes. In 2019, Georgia cigarette consumers

surcharge payments benefit USG members?

paid a total tax of $13.76 per 10-pack carton

First, it can be argued that this penalty works

(Cammenga, 2019). The negative conse-

to disincentivize tobacco use, which is a ma-

quences imposed are inherently meant to

jor cause of preventable diseases. By de-

cause behavioral changes that result in less

creasing tobacco product usage, both the in-

tobacco product usage.

dividual and society benefit. Second, by

The question arises about other be-

agreeing to impose this surcharge, the BOR

haviors that lead to negative health effects

was perhaps able to negotiate lower insur-

and the selective targeting of tobacco usage.

ance premiums for non-tobacco users.

While tobacco usage has been on the de-

While the tobacco surcharge may be

cline, obesity, which was described by

considered to encourage a social good (less

McCafferty et al. (2020) as a “. . . a public

tobacco product usage), an opt-in program

health epidemic in the United States. . .” now

would do the same. Changing to an opt-in

affects 39.8% of the population and is ex-

program would not eliminate the surcharge

pected to affect about 53% of the population

imposed on members who use tobacco prod-

by 2030 (p. 1). Sedentary behavior and ex-

ucts. In addition, if the tobacco surcharge

cessive intake of calories, sugar, and alcohol

was changed to an opt-in rather than an opt-

can all lead to negative health outcomes.

out program, total amounts of surcharges

Nevertheless, tobacco usage is singled out

collected by insurance providers should not

as a punishable behavior worthy of a sur-

be lessened. Assuming that members are

charge. Why is there not also a surcharge for

truthful in reporting their tobacco usage,

other forms of health issues that are under

which is assumed in the current opt-out pro-

the control of the member? By the same rea-

gram, insurance providers would collect the

soning, should a surcharge not also be levied

same revenues. Lying in reporting tobacco

on members based on their self-reported ca-

usage is already disincentivized by the pos-

loric intake, on the number of alcoholic drinks

sibility of the member being criminally prose-

they self-report as consumed each week, or

cuted and losing their job. This penalty ap-

on self-reported levels of exercise?

plies whether or not the member lies to opt-
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out or lies to not opt-in. Inadvertent errors by

surcharge can be characterized as poten-

non-tobacco users in failing to opt-out pro-

tially burdensome.

duces an ongoing punishment—one that

In addition, members who inadvert-

lasts for at least a year—since the election

ently fail to opt-out are, without recourse,

can only be changed during an annual enroll-

locked into paying the surcharge for an entire

ment period and cannot be retroactively cor-

year, and perhaps longer if they miss the

rected. Hence, insurance providers can sub-

next opt-out opportunity. Notably, failure to

stantially benefit from member error. Such

opt-out results in the surcharge being levied

errors can be minimized by adopting an opt-

on not only the member but also on all the

in program.

member’s applicable dependents. As indi-

Members who are users of tobacco

cated in the above literature review, opt-out

products pay a severe penalty. Since sur-

programs can benefit the consumer (e.g.,

charges are fixed amounts, they dispropor-

pension plans, saving plans) by providing a

tionately impact members with lower sala-

valuable benefit; or they can be used to take

ries. As indicated in Table 6, the lower the

advantage of inertia which results in in-

average salary, the higher the percentage

creased provider revenues (e.g., payment

represented by the tobacco surcharge—in

protection insurance, increased union fees).

effect, the surcharge can be likened to a re-

The USG’s opt-out policy is of the latter type.

gressive tax. Based on type of institution and

Such surcharge payments—those paid due

employment level, the tobacco surcharge

to member error—create a “windfall” for the

paid by faculty represents 1% to 12.8% of

insurance companies—what might be char-

their salaries. Similar rates would also apply

acterized as an ill-gotten increase in insur-

to non-instructional faculty with comparable

ance company gross margins (Table 5). An

salaries. As previously indicated, a single

opt-in program would eliminate tobacco sur-

member without dependents who uses to-

charges caused by member error.

bacco products and earns an annual salary

Ethics is another consideration that

of $50,000 pays a surcharge that represents

should be taken into account in deciding to

2.4% of their salary. In comparison, the max-

change to an opt-in program. As indicated in

imum Georgia income tax rate in 2019 was

the literature review, organ donors who may

5.75%. Are the surcharge amounts fair and

be opposed to donating their organs can be

reasonable? The authors suggest that for

trapped into agreeing to do so by an opt-out

USG members with relative lower salaries,

program. This adverse effect is often dis-

the answer is no; at the very least, the

missed by using a “greater good” argument.
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The tobacco surcharge is different. An opt-

selection carries forward automatically until it

out program for tobacco product usage is

is changed. An option without a default would

more like the example of U.K. borrowers be-

also be feasible where a simple yes/no ques-

ing tricked into purchasing unwanted insur-

tion about tobacco usage would be required

ance. An opt-out program for tobacco prod-

to be answered before a member could gain

uct usage mainly benefits the bottom line of

access to the open enrollment portal, essen-

insurance providers. Indirectly, non-smokers

tially eliminating the user error scenario. It

may benefit (probably minimally, if at all—it

appears that a major driver of an insurance

is unlikely that this windfall is passed on to

company preference for an opt-out program

members) through lower premiums from

is the collection of revenues from members

member error in not opting out. Even if this is

who unwittingly fail to opt-out. The penalty

the case, is this treatment fair and equitable?

paid by those who fail to opt-out is severe.

There is no benefit to non-smokers of being

Lastly, the ethics of subsidizing premium

charged a tobacco surcharge. Is it the right

costs by taking advantage of member error

thing to do to severely penalize a member for

should be considered.

inadvertently not opting out as a tobacco

In answer to the research question

user and by so doing secure a benefit for the

(RQ), the authors believe that there is ample

good of the many—perhaps, only secure a

support for the USG changing their Well-Be-

benefit for the insurance provider? Changing

ing Initiative tobacco use policy from an opt-

to an opt-in policy eliminates the possibility of

out program to an opt-in program. The as-

this ethically questionable consequence.

sumption should be that the member and
their dependents are not tobacco product us-

Conclusions and Proposals

ers unless the member affirmatively declares

The opt-out assumption that defaults to all

differently.

The non-tobacco preference

members being tobacco users is not sup-

should become the default for the following

ported by national tobacco product usage

health plan year. This is similar to the de-

data—rather, the opposite is true. Changing

pendent election. Once a dependent is en-

from the current opt-out program to an opt-in

tered, they remain a dependent by default for

program would not affect insurance company

each subsequent plan year.

revenues—the same amounts should be col-

In addition, the authors suggest that

lected under either approach. Alternatively, a

policy makers reconsider the levying of the

‘sticky’ default could be used where an em-

surcharge. Tobacco and cigarette users are

ployee makes a selection once and that

already penalized by being restricted in
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where they can use the products. Cigarette

tobacco surcharge penalty is a slippery

users already pay high excess taxes— “sin”

slope, which could lead to other surcharges

taxes. Moreover, tobacco users are continu-

being negotiated by insurance companies. In

ally warned by their doctors and through the

the opinion of the authors, the best solution

media about the negative consequences of

is for no surcharges to be imposed.

their bad habit. Does an additional penalty,

Even if the tobacco surcharge pen-

especially a severe one such as USG’s to-

alty is not eliminated, policy makers should

bacco surcharge, really decrease the inci-

reconsider the way the penalty is imple-

dence of tobacco product usage? Friedman

mented. As currently structured the penalty

et al.s’ (2016) results regarding the market

can be severe, especially to members who

place implementation of the Affordable Care

earn relatively lower salaries. The fixed

Act’s (ACA) tobacco surcharges suggest that

amounts of the tobacco use surcharge, like

tobacco use cessation is not incentivized by

excise taxes (e.g., “sin” taxes) and sales

surcharges:

taxes (Tax Foundation, n.d.), are regressive.

Relative to those facing no sur-

That is, the less the member earns, the larger

charges, smokers facing medium or

the percentage of their income that is repre-

high surcharges had significantly re-

sented by the surcharge. As indicated in Ta-

duced coverage (-4.4 to -11.6 per-

ble 6, the tobacco surcharge penalty can

centage points), but no significant dif-

amount to a significant percentage of a mem-

ferences

ber’s annual salary.

in

smoking

cessation.

Taken together, these findings suggest that tobacco surcharges con-

Limitations

flicted with a major goal of the ACA—

This research was limited by a lack of access

increased financial protection—with-

to pertinent data. As of the present writing,

out increasing smoking cessation.

the authors have not been able to obtain in-

(Friedman et al., 2016, p. 1176)

formation regarding the total number of em-

Moreover, should tobacco product users be

ployees covered by a USG-sponsored health

targeted for a penalty while numerous other

insurance plan, the total amount of instruc-

potentially health-related behaviors are not?

tional and non-instructional surcharges paid

Surcharges in general decrease the benefi-

by year, and various demographic data for

cial effects of insurance premiums being

non-instructional employees. Therefore, esti-

computed on group averages. The present

mates were necessitated regarding the total

authors suggest that the imposition of the

tobacco surcharges paid by members, the
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potential windfall to insurance companies of

the tobacco surcharge impact on faculty as a

members indivertibly failing to opt-out, and

percentage of average salaries.
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